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Abstract
Argumentation theory has become an important topic in the field of AI. The basic idea is to construct arguments in favor and
against a statement, to select the “acceptable” ones and, finally, to determine whether the original statement can be accepted or not.
Several argumentation systems have been proposed in the literature. Some of them, the so-called rule-based systems, use a particular
logical language with strict and defeasible rules. While these systems are useful in different domains (e.g. legal reasoning), they
unfortunately lead to very unintuitive results, as is discussed in this paper. In order to avoid such anomalies, in this paper we are
interested in defining principles, called rationality postulates, that can be used to judge the quality of a rule-based argumentation
system. In particular, we define two important rationality postulates that should be satisfied: the consistency and the closure of the
results returned by that system. We then provide a relatively easy way in which these rationality postulates can be warranted for a
particular rule-based argumentation system developed within a European project on argumentation.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Agents express claims and judgments when engaged in decision making, drawing conclusions, imparting informa-
tion, and when persuading and negotiating with other agents. Information may be uncertain and incomplete, or there
may be relevant but partially conflicting information. Also, in multi-agents systems, conflicts of interest are inevitable.
To address these problems, agents can use argumentation, a process based on the exchange and valuation of arguments
for and against opinions, proposals, claims and decisions.
Argumentation, in its essence, can be seen as a particular useful and intuitive paradigm for doing nonmonotonic
reasoning. The advantage of argumentation is that the reasoning process is composed of modular and quite intuitive
steps, and thus avoids the monolithic approach of many traditional logics for defeasible reasoning. The process of
argumentation starts with the construction of a set of arguments based on a given knowledge base. As some of these
arguments may attack each other, one needs to apply a criterion for determining the sets of arguments that can be re-
garded as “acceptable”: the argument-based extensions. The last step is then to examine whether a particular statement
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M. Caminada, L. Amgoud / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 286–310 287can be regarded as justified. This can for instance be the case if every extension contains an argument which has this
statement as its conclusion. An interesting property of the argumentation approach is that it can be given dialectical
proof procedures that are quite close to the process by which humans would discuss an issue. The similarity with
human-style discussions gives formal argumentation an advantage that can be useful in many contexts.
Argumentation has developed into an important area of study in artificial intelligence over the last fifteen years,
especially in sub-fields such as nonmonotonic reasoning (e.g. [19,25,26,28,43,45]), multiple-source information sys-
tems (e.g. [7,9,21]), decision making (e.g. [2,11,12,20,30–32]), and modeling interactions between agents (e.g. [3,8,
10,14,18,35–38,41]). Several argumentation systems have been developed for handling inconsistency in knowledge
bases (e.g. [5,15–17,29,33,34,39,42,44]), in other words for inference. All these systems are built around a logical
language and an associated consequence relation that is used for defining an argument. Some of these systems, called
rule-based systems, use a particular logical language defined over a set of literals, and two kinds of rules: strict rules
and defeasible ones. Arguments and conflicts among them are first identified, and then an acceptability semantics (e.g.
Dung’s semantics) is applied in order to determine the “acceptable” arguments. Examples of such systems are Prakken
and Sartor’s system [42], Garcia and Simari’s system [33], Governatori et al.’s system [34], and Amgoud et al.’s sys-
tem [4]. Such systems are suitable in some domains like legal reasoning, where knowledge cannot be represented in
a classical propositional language for instance. Unfortunately, existing rule-based systems fail to meet the objectives
of an inference system, and can lead to very unintuitive results. Indeed, with these systems it may be the case that an
agent believes that “if a then it is always the case that b”, and the system returns as output a but not b. Worse yet, if
the agent also believes that “if c then it is always the case that ¬b”, the system may return a and c, which means that
the output of the system is indirectly inconsistent.
In what follows, we will focus only on rule-based argumentation systems. In order to avoid anomalies like the
ones discussed above, the aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, as in the field of belief revision, where the
well-known AGM-postulates serve as general properties a system for belief revision should fulfill, we are interested in
defining some principles (called rationality postulates) that any rule-based argumentation system should obey. These
postulates will govern the sound definition of an argumentation system and will avoid anomalous results. In this paper
we focus particularly on two important postulates: the closure and the consistency of the results that an argumentation
system may produce. These postulates are violated in systems such as [4,33,34,42]. On the other hand, we study
various ways in which these postulates can be warranted in the argumentation system developed in [4], as well as in
various other systems.
This paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, we recall the basic concepts behind argumentation theory.
We present the abstract argumentation framework of Dung [28], as well as one particular instantiation of it, for
which we have chosen the ASPIC argumentation formalism [4]. In Section 3, we show some examples that yield
very unintuitive and undesirable results, not only for the ASPIC argumentation system, but also for various other
argumentation formalisms. Then, in Section 4, we state a number of postulates, based on the analysis of the examples
in Section 3, that we think any rule-based argumentation formalism should satisfy. Section 5 proposes a number
of generic solutions which can be applied to the argumentation formalism described in Section 2, as well as to other
argumentation formalisms where similar problems occur (such as [33,34,42]). Two main solutions are suggested, each
of which satisfies all the earlier mentioned rationality postulates. The first approach is applicable to formalisms that
make use of classical logic, the other one is applicable to formalisms that do not. Section 6 then contains an overview
of the main results of this paper, as well as some open research issues.
2. Argumentation process
Argumentation can be seen as a reasoning process consisting of the following four steps:
(1) Constructing arguments (in favor of/against a “statement”) from a knowledge base.
(2) Determining the different conflicts among the arguments.
(3) Evaluating the acceptability of the different arguments.
(4) Concluding, or defining the justified conclusions.
Some argumentation formalisms also allow arguments to be of different strengths, but for the sake of simplicity we
will not address this issue in the current paper. Many argumentation formalisms are built around an underlying logical
288 M. Caminada, L. Amgoud / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 286–310language L and an associated notion of logical consequence, defining the notion of argument. Argument construction
is a monotonic process: new knowledge cannot rule out an argument but only gives rise to new arguments which may
interact with the first argument. Since the knowledge bases may give rise to inconsistent conclusions, the arguments
may be conflicting too. Consequently, it is important to determine among all the available arguments, the ones that are
ultimately acceptable. In [28], an argumentation system is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Argumentation system). An argumentation system is a pair 〈A,Def 〉 where A is a set of arguments and
Def ⊆A×A is a defeat relation. We say that an argument A defeats an argument B iff (A,B) ∈ Def (or A Def B).
Starting from the set of all (possibly conflicting) arguments, it is important to know which of them can be relied on
for inferring conclusions and for making decisions. To answer this question, different attempts for defining semantics
for the notion of acceptability have been made. Some approaches return a unique set of acceptable arguments, called
an extension, giving a unique status to each argument, whereas others return several extensions, allowing multiple
status for arguments. In [28] different semantics for the notion of acceptability have been proposed. These last have
been recently refined in [13,24]. In what follows, only Dung’s semantics are recalled for illustration purposes.
Definition 2 (Conflict-free, Defense). Let A and B be sets of arguments, and let B ⊆ A.
• B is conflict-free iff there exist no A, B in B such that A Def B .
• B defends an argument A iff for each argument B ∈A, if B Def A, then there exists an argument C in B such that
C Def B .
Definition 3 (Acceptability semantics). Let B be a conflict-free set of arguments, and let F : 2A → 2A be a function
such that F(B) = {A | B defends A}.
• B is admissible iff it is conflict-free and defends every element in B.
• B is a complete extension iff B =F(B).
• B is a grounded extension iff it is the minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension.
• B is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension.
• B is a stable extension iff it is a preferred extension that defeats w.r.t. Def all arguments in A\B.
Note that a unique grounded extension always exists, although it may be the empty set. It contains all the arguments
which are not defeated, as well as the arguments which are defended directly or indirectly by non-defeated arguments.
In the remainder of this paper we use the expression “Dung’s standard semantics” to refer to complete, grounded
and preferred semantics. We use the unqualified term “extension” to refer to a complete, grounded or preferred exten-
sion.
Dung’s abstract argumentation theory leaves open the question of how arguments actually look like, how they
are constructed from a knowledge base and the conditions under which one argument defeats the other. Several for-
malisms, such as [4,34,42] aim to fill this gap.
In this paper we have chosen to treat one particular argumentation formalism called ASPIC system [4], as an illus-
tration of how Dung’s abstract argumentation formalism can be applied for reasoning in the presence of inconsistency,
or for inference. The choice of ASPIC formalism is, we must admit, somewhat arbitrary. We have chosen it mainly
because of its relative simplicity, and the fact that we have been closely connected to its development. In fact, much
of the current paper is a result of an analysis of the difficulties we encountered when constructing the formalism,
difficulties that turned out also to play a role in other formalisms for argumentation and nonmonotonic reasoning.
In what follows, L is a set of literals. We assume the availability of a function “−”, which works with L, such that
−ψ = φ iff ψ = ¬φ and −ψ = ¬φ iff ψ = φ.
A strict rule is an expression of the form φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ (n 0), indicating that if φ1, . . . , φn hold, then without
exception it holds that ψ . A defeasible rule is an expression of the form φ1, . . . , φn 	⇒ ψ (n 0), indicating that if
φ1, . . . , φn hold, then it usually holds that ψ . For both a strict and defeasible rule it holds that each φi (1 i  n) as
well as ψ are elements of L.
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rules.
Definition 5 (Closure of a set of formulas). Let P ⊆ L. The closure of P under the set S of strict rules, denoted
ClS(P), is the smallest set such that:
• P ⊆ ClS(P).
• if φ1, . . . , φn → ψ ∈ S and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ClS(P) then ψ ∈ ClS(P).
If P = ClS(P), then P is said to be closed under the set S .
Definition 6 (Consistent set). Let P ⊆ L. P is consistent iff ψ , φ ∈ P such that ψ = −φ, otherwise it is said to be
inconsistent.
From a defeasible theory 〈S,D〉, arguments can be built. Before defining the arguments, we first introduce some
functions. The function Conc returns the “top” conclusion of an argument (i.e. the last conclusion), Sub returns all
its sub-arguments and finally the functions StrictRules and DefRules return respectively all the strict rules and
the defeasible rules used in an argument.
In what follows, an argument has a deductive form and is constructed in a recursive way by applying one or more
strict or defeasible rules. In order to distinguish them from the strict and defeasible object level rules, we use short
arrows for the strict and defeasible argument construction rules.
Definition 7 (Argument). Let 〈S,D〉 be a defeasible theory. An argument A is:
• A1, . . . ,An → ψ if A1, . . . ,An, with n  0, are arguments such that there exists a strict rule Conc(A1), . . . ,
Conc(An) −→ ψ .
Conc(A) = ψ ,
Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}.
StrictRules(A) = StrictRules(A1)∪ · · · ∪StrictRules(An)∪{Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) −→ ψ},
DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ DefRules(An).
• A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ψ if A1, . . . ,An, with n 0, are arguments such that there exists a defeasible rule Conc(A1), . . . ,
Conc(An) 	⇒ ψ .
Conc(A) = ψ ,
Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A},
StrictRules(A) = StrictRules(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ StrictRules(An),
DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ DefRules(An) ∪ {Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) 	⇒ ψ}.
Arg denotes the set of all arguments that can be built from the theory 〈S,D〉. Let A,A′ ∈Arg.
• A′ is a subargument of A iff A′ ∈ Sub(A).
• A′ is a direct subargument of A iff A′ ∈ Sub(A), A′′ ∈ Arg, A′′ ∈ Sub(A), A′ ∈ Sub(A′′), A = A′′, and
A′ = A′′.
• A is an atomic argument iff A′ ∈Arg, A′ = A, and A′ ∈ Sub(A).
Let us illustrate the above definition with the following example.
Example 1. Let S = {−→ a;−→ d} and D = {a 	⇒ b;d 	⇒ ¬b}. The following arguments can be built:
A1 : [→ a] A3 : [A1 ⇒ b]
A2 : [→ d] A4 : [A2 ⇒ ¬b]
A1 and A2 are atomic arguments. A1 is a direct subargument of A3, and A2 is a direct subargument of A4.
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Definition 8 (Strict vs. defeasible argument). Let A be an argument. A is strict iff DefRules(A) = ∅, otherwise A
is called defeasible.
Generally arguments may be in conflict with each other in different manners. The first kind of conflicts concerns
the conclusions of the arguments. Indeed, two arguments may conflict with each other if they support contradictory
conclusions.
Definition 9 (Rebutting). Let A, B ∈Arg. A rebuts B iff ∃A′ ∈ Sub(A) with Conc(A′) = φ and ∃B ′ ∈ Sub(B) with
B ′ a non-strict argument and Conc(B ′) = −φ.
Example 2. Let S = {−→ a;−→ t;a −→ b},D = {b 	⇒ c; t 	⇒ ¬b;¬b 	⇒ d}. The argument [[[→ a] → b] ⇒ c]
rebuts [[[→ t] ⇒ ¬b] ⇒ d]. The reverse is not true.
The above definition puts strict arguments above defeasible ones in the sense that a strict argument can rebut a
defeasible one, but the reverse cannot be the case. Note that this definition of rebutting is more general than the
classical one defined in [29]. Indeed, in [29], an argument is supposed to have only one conclusion. The intermediate
consequences obtained when building that argument are not taken into account. However, in [4] arguments may
disagree not only on their conclusions, but also on their intermediate consequences.
Two arguments may also conflict if one of them uses a defeasible rule whose applicability is disputed by the
other argument. In the following definition, . stands for the objectivation operator [40], which converts a meta-
level expression (in our case: a defeasible rule) into an object-level expression (in our case: a literal). This is needed
because, syntactically, the conclusion of a rule can only be a literal, whereas with undercutting one wants to express
the inapplicability of a rule.
Definition 10 (Undercutting). Let A and B be arguments. A undercuts B iff ∃B ′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form B ′′1 , . . . ,B ′′n ⇒
ψ and ∃A′ ∈ Sub(A) with Conc(A′) = ¬Conc(B ′′1 ), . . . ,Conc(B ′′n) 	⇒ ψ.
As an example to illustrate the difference between rebutting and undercutting, consider argument A: “The object
is red because John says it looks red”. A rebutter of A could be (B1) “The object is not red because Suzy says it looks
blue”. An undercutter of A could be [40] (B2) “The object is merely illuminated by a red light.” This, of course, is
not a reason for it not being red, but merely indicates that the fact that it looks red is no longer a reason for it actually
being red.
The two relations: undercut and rebut are brought together is the definition of “defeat” as follows:1
Definition 11 (Defeat). Let A and B be elements of Arg. We say that A defeats B iff
(1) A rebuts B , or
(2) A undercuts B .
The ASPIC system, built from a theory T = 〈S,D〉, is a pair 〈Arg,Defeat〉, where Arg is the set of arguments
built from T using Definition 7, and Defeat is the relation given in the above Definition 11. For determining among
elements of Arg the acceptable arguments, any of Dung’s standard semantics (Definition 3) can be applied. We will
write E1, . . . ,En to denote the different extensions under one of those semantics.
We can show that if an argument is in a given extension, then all its sub-arguments are also in that extension.
1 In the original ASPIC system, it is also possible to take into account the relative strength of the arguments when determining when argument A
defeats argument B . For reasons of simplicity, argument strength is not treated in the current discussion. In [6], it has been shown that it is
straightforward to extend the system to handle preferences.
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one of Dung’s standard semantics. ∀Ei ∈ {E1, . . . ,En},∀A ∈ Ei , Sub(A) ⊆ Ei .2
The last step of an argumentation process consists of determining, among all the conclusions of the different
arguments, the ones that can ultimately be accepted: the justified conclusions. Let Output denote this set of justified
conclusions. One way of defining Output is to consider the conclusions that are supported by at least one argument
in each extension. The idea is that one should not only define rationality postulates for each individual extension, but
also for the overall justified conclusions, thus the need for Output.
Definition 12 (Justified conclusions). Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system, and {E1, . . . ,En} (n 1) be its
set of extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics.
• Concs(Ei) = {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} (1 i  n).
• Output=⋂i=1...n Concs(Ei).
It should be noticed that Output is defined using a skeptical attitude. This is a deliberate choice, since basing
Output on a credulous attitude can result in inconsistencies, even in the case where each individual extension has
consistent conclusions. In the remainder of this paper, we are interested in both the conclusions of an individual
extension (Concs(Ei)) as well as in the overall justified conclusions (Output).
It should also be noticed that for simplicity we do not consider the case where there are no extensions. This, for
instance, rules out a treatment of stable semantics in this paper.
Let us consider the following illustrative example as an illustration of the above definitions.
Example 3. Let S = {−→ a;−→ d} and D = {a 	⇒ b;d 	⇒ ¬b}. The following arguments can be constructed:
A1 : [→ a] A3 : [A1 ⇒ b]
A2 : [→ d] A4 : [A2 ⇒ ¬b]
Argument A3 defeats A4 and vice versa. However, the arguments A1 and A2 do not have any defeaters. Thus, they
belong to each extension. Consequently, a and d will be considered as justified conclusions.
3. Some problems in argumentation frameworks
In this section, we start first by proving some interesting properties of the formalism described in the previous
section, especially regarding the consistency of its conclusions. It will then be argued that these properties may not be
enough to warrant a good quality of the formalism. It turns out that there exist anomalies that occur not only in the
above described first version of the ASPIC formalism, but also in several other of today’s argumentation formalisms.
Before discussing all these issues in detail, let us first introduce a notion that is useful for the rest of the paper, that of
consistency of a set S of strict rules.
Definition 13 (Consistent set of strict rules). Let S be a set of strict rules. S is said to be consistent iff A, B ∈Arg
such that A and B are strict arguments and Conc(A) = −Conc(B).
In the remainder of this paper, we will use the pair 〈A,Def 〉 to refer to any argumentation system that is built
around a defeasible theory T . The structure of arguments and the conflict relation are unspecified. This means that
arguments in A may be defined for instance as a tree, a sequence, etc. Similarly, one may consider any definition
of the relation Def . Moreover, this argumentation system may use any acceptability semantics, i.e. Dung’s standards
ones or their different refinements or alternatives proposed in the literature.
2 Proofs for propositions and theorems can be found in Appendix A of the paper.
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The ASPIC system, like many other formalisms in the field of argumentation and defeasible reasoning, satisfies
the requirement that each extension has consistent conclusions.
Proposition 2. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from a theory 〈S,D〉 with S consistent, and
E1, . . . ,En its different extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics. Concs(Ei) is consistent for each 1 
i  n.
We can verify that if the sets of conclusions of the different extensions are consistent, then the output of the system
is also consistent. Note that this result is general in the sense that it does not depend on the particular definitions of
argument structure and defeat of the ASPIC system.
Proposition 3. Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Let E1, . . . ,En be
its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics, and Output be as in Definition 12.
If Concs(Ei) is consistent for each 1 i  n then Output is consistent.
From Propositions 2 and 3, we can then deduce that the output of the ASPIC system is consistent.
Property 1. Let T be a defeasible theory with S consistent, 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from T .
Then, Output is consistent.
3.2. Some problematic examples
The sole fact that a formalism for defeasible reasoning or argumentation returns consistent results may in many
cases not be enough to warrant the absence of other anomalies. To make this point more clear, it is interesting to
consider the following example.
Example 4 (Married John). Let S = {−→ wr;−→ go;b −→ ¬hw;m −→ hw} and D = {wr 	⇒ m;go 	⇒ b} with:
wr = “John wears something that looks like a wedding ring”, m = “John is married”, hw = “John has a wife”, go =
“John often goes out until late with his friends”, b = “John is a bachelor”. The following arguments can be constructed:
A1 : [→ wr] A4 : [A2 ⇒ b]
A2 : [→ go] A5 : [A3 → hw]
A3 : [A1 ⇒ m] A6 : [A4 → ¬hw]
The argument A5 defeats the argument A6 and vice versa. However, the arguments A1, A2, A3 and A4 do not have
any defeaters. If one applies, for instance, grounded semantics, the grounded extension then becomes {A1, A2, A3,
A4}. Consequently, Output = {wr,go,m,b}, this means that both m (“John is married”) and b (“John is a bachelor”)
are considered justified.
Example 4 clearly shows that counter-intuitive conclusions may be inferred from a defeasible theory using the
above argumentation framework. As a consequence, the closure of the set of inferences under the set of strict rules
may be inconsistent. In the previous example, the closure of Output(= {wr,go,m,b}) under the set of strict rules
is {wr,go,m,b,hw,¬hw} which is inconsistent. To some extent, the problem can be identified as m and b being
incompatible without the entailment mechanism being strong enough to detect this. If, for instance, in the previous
example it would be allowed to apply contraposition on m −→ hw and b −→ ¬hw then counterarguments against m
and b could be constructed, which would prevent them to follow from the same extension.
The above example is problematic not only in the ASPIC system. In fact, the defeasible logic of Donald Nute, as
described in [34] suffers from exactly the same problem. When one translates the example to Nute’s particular syntax,
one obtains essentially the same result: m and b are justified, and hw and ¬hw are left undecided.
It should be noted that another argumentation formalism, stated by Prakken and Sartor [42], is defined in such a
way to avoid the problematic outcome of Example 4. When translated to the formalism of [42], Example 4 no longer
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A rebuts argument B in [42] iff it is possible to “add” strict rules to A and B (like m −→ hw to A and b −→ ¬hw
to B) such that the extended versions of A and B have opposite conclusions.
Although Prakken and Sartor’s solution works for the case of Example 4, there exist other examples where their
approach still yields anomalies. A relatively straightforward case is the following.
Example 5. Let S = {−→ a;−→ d;−→ c;b, e −→ ¬c} and D = {a 	⇒ b;d 	⇒ e}. Here, the arguments
A = [[→ a] ⇒ b]
B = [[→ d] ⇒ e]
C = [→ c]
do not have any defeaters. This means that A, B and C are in any Dung-style extension. Therefore, the propositions
b, e and c are considered justified. Note that although there exists a strict rule b, e −→ ¬c, ¬c is not a justified
conclusion. This shows that the justified conclusions are not closed under strict rules. Worse yet, the closure of the
justified conclusions under strict rules may even be inconsistent.
The last formalism to be discussed is that of García and Simari [33]. It is interesting to notice that this formalism
can properly handle both Examples 4 and 5. It essentially does so by considering two arguments to be conflicting
(disagreeing) iff from their respective conclusions, an inconsistency can be derived using strict rules only. Although
this indeed yields the desired results in Examples 4 and 5, there still exist examples that are not handled correctly.
Example 6. Let S = {−→ a;−→ d;−→ g;b, c, e, f −→ ¬g} and D = {a 	⇒ b;b 	⇒ c;d 	⇒ e; e 	⇒ f }. Now,
consider the following arguments:
A = [[→ a] ⇒ b]
B = [[→ d] ⇒ e]
C = [[A ⇒ c]
D = [[B ⇒ f ]
The arguments A, B , C and D do not have any defeaters. To see why, consider for instance argument D. D has
no defeaters because there is no argument that can produce a literal (conclusion) that disagrees with f . Similar
observations also hold for A, B and C. Because A, B , C and D do not have defeaters, they are automatically ultimately
acceptable. This means that the literals b, c, e and f are justified (as well as the facts a and g). This means that the
closure of the justified conclusions under strict rules is again inconsistent!
3.3. Discussion
The way the above mentioned argumentation systems deal with the critical examples is unsatisfactory from a
conceptual point of view. Suppose, for instance, a user wants to use an inference engine of Defeasible Logic [34]. For
this, he provides the inference engine with a set of strict and defeasible rules. Suppose one of the strict rules is of the
form: “if m then it is always the case that hw”. Then he may be very surprised to find that the outcome of the inference
engine contains m but not hw. Worse yet, if the user tries to do his own reasoning based on the inference engine’s
output (“My inference engine says m and I know that m always implies hw, so it must hold that hw. My inference
engine also says that b and I know that b always implies ¬hw, so it must hold that ¬hw.”) then the outcome is directly
inconsistent.
The problem with the above examples is that the language used is not expressive enough to capture all the different
kinds of conflicts that may exist between arguments. As a consequence of missing some conflicts, the conclusions
may be counter-intuitive. In Example 4, for instance, it should simply not be possible to conclude that John is both
married and bachelor, as deriving these conclusions means that problems of inconsistency and non-closure appear.
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Like any reasoning model, an argumentation-based system should satisfy some principles which support the system
to be of good quality. The aim of this section is to present and to discuss three important postulates: direct consistency,
indirect consistency and closure, that any rule-based argumentation-based system should satisfy in order to avoid the
problems discussed in the previous section.
The idea of closure is that the answer of an argumentation-engine should be closed under strict rules. That is, if we
provide the engine with a strict rule a −→ b (“if a then it is also without exception the case that b”), together with
various other rules, and our inference engine outputs a as justified conclusion, then it should also output b as justified
conclusion. Consequently, b should also be supported by an acceptable argument.
We say that an argumentation system satisfies closure if its set of justified conclusions, as well as the set of conclu-
sions supported by each extension are closed.
Postulate 1 (Closure). Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Output is
its set of justified conclusions, and E1, . . . ,En its extensions under a given semantics. 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies closure iff :
(1) Concs(Ei) = ClS(Concs(Ei)) for each 1 i  n.
(2) Output= ClS(Output).
The first condition says that every extension should be closed in the sense that an extension should contain all the
arguments acceptable w.r.t. it. As closure is an important property, one should search for ways to alter or constrain
one’s argumentation formalism in such a way that its resulting extensions and conclusions satisfy closure.
It can be shown that if the different sets of conclusions of the extensions are closed, then the set Output is also
closed.
Proposition 4. Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Let E1, . . . ,En be
its extensions under a given semantics, and Output be as in Definition 12.
If Concs(Ei) = ClS(Concs(Ei) for each 1 i  n, then Output= ClS(Output).
Another important property of an argumentation system is direct consistency. An argumentation system satisfies di-
rect consistency if its set of justified conclusions and the different sets of conclusions corresponding to each extension
are consistent. Formally:
Postulate 2 (Direct Consistency). Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T .
Output is its set of justified conclusions, and E1, . . . ,En its extensions under a given semantics. 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies
direct consistency iff :
(1) Concs(Ei) is consistent for each 1 i  n.
(2) Output is consistent.
Most argumentation systems satisfy the above postulate of direct consistency. Unfortunately, they often violate the
postulate of indirect consistency. By indirect consistency we mean that (1) the closure under the set of strict rules of
the set of justified conclusions is consistent, and (2) for each extension, the closure under the set of strict rules of its
conclusions is consistent. When this postulate is violated, it means that undesirable conclusions can be inferred.
Postulate 3 (Indirect Consistency). Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T .
Output is its set of justified conclusions, and E1, . . . ,En its extensions under a given semantics. 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies
indirect consistency iff :
(1) ClS(Concs(Ei)) is consistent for each 1 i  n.
(2) ClS(Output) is consistent.
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The effects of violated postulates
Postulate Violation can result in
Direct consistency Absurdities
Indirect consistency Users not being allowed to apply
modus ponens on strict rules
Closure Conclusions that should come
out appear to be missing
Again, we can show that if all the extensions produce a consistent closed output, then the closure of the set Output
is consistent. Formally:
Proposition 5. Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Let E1, . . . ,En be
its extensions under a given semantics, and let Output be as in Definition 12.
If ClS(Concs(Ei)) is consistent for each 1 i  n, then ClS(Output) is consistent.
Another straightforward result is that, if indirect consistency is satisfied by an argumentation system, then direct
consistency is also satisfied by that system.
Proposition 6. If an argumentation system 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies indirect consistency, then it also satisfies direct consis-
tency.
In addition to the above result, one can show that a formalism that satisfies closure as well as direct consistency
also satisfies indirect consistency.
Proposition 7. Let 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system. If 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies closure and direct consistency, then it
also satisfies indirect consistency.
So far, we have identified a number of rationality postulates and examined the effects of their violation. Table 1
provides a brief summary of these effects. As for direct consistency, the situation is straightforward. When direct
consistency is violated, two contradictory statements (say ψ and ¬ψ ) are justified at the same time, which is clearly
an absurdity. As for indirect inconsistency—which is for instance violated in the original “Married John” example
(Example 4)—the situation is somewhat more complex. It can be the case that a formalism satisfies direct consistency
but violates indirect consistency (an example would be the Defeasible Logic of Donald Nute [33]). In that case,
the users of an implementation of such a system would be disallowed from doing their own reasoning based on its
outcome. That is, one may not take the outcome of the formalism and apply modus ponens using the strict rules, as
otherwise absurdities may result.
As for the property of closure, the basic idea is that the conclusions of the formalism should be “complete”. It
should not be the case that the user must do its own reasoning (take the outcome of the formalism and apply modus
ponens using the strict rules) to derive statements that the formalism apparently “forgot” to entail. A formalism that
satisfies closure has done all of this work by itself.
5. Possible solutions
The aim of this section is to “repair” the ASPIC system defined in [4], by providing two solutions that satisfy the
three rationality postulates discussed in the previous section. Thus, in all what follows, we will handle only the system
of [4]. Nevertheless, the proposed solutions could also be implemented in [33,34,42].
According to Proposition 2 and Property 1, it is clear that this system already satisfies direct consistency.
Property 2. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from a theory 〈S,D〉 with S consistent. 〈Arg,Defeat〉
satisfies direct consistency (i.e. Postulate 2).
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analysis of Example 4 is that some strict rules are missing. That is, if the rules ¬hw −→ ¬m and hw −→ ¬b (which
are the contraposed versions of the existing rules m −→ hw and b −→ ¬hw) are added to S , then one can, for instance,
construct a counter-argument against [[→ go] ⇒ b]: [[[[→ wr] ⇒ m] → hw] → ¬b]. The basic idea is then to make
explicit in S this implicit information by computing a closure of the set S . The question then becomes whether it is
possible to define a closure operator Cl on S such that the outcome makes sure that the argumentation system built
on the defeasible theory 〈Cl(S),D〉 satisfies closure and consistency.
5.1. Strict rules closed under classical entailment
One way to define a closure operator given a set of strict rules would be to convert the strict rules to material
implications, calculate their closure under propositional logic, and convert the result back to strict rules again. In what
follows,  denotes classical inference.
Definition 14 (Propositional operator). Let S be a set of strict rules and P ⊆ L. We define the following functions:
• Prop(S) = {φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn ⊃ ψ | φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ ∈ S};
• Cnprop(P) = {ψ | P  ψ};
• Rules(P) = {φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ | φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn ⊃ ψ ∈P}.
The propositional closure of S is Clpp(S) = Rules(Cnprop(Prop(S))).
First of all, it can easily be seen that Clpp satisfies the following three properties, which follow from the nature of
classical logic:
Property 3. Let S be a set of strict rules and let S1,S2 ⊆ S .
(1) S ⊆ Clpp(S);
(2) If S1 ⊆ S2 then Clpp(S1) ⊆ Clpp(S2);
(3) Clpp(Clpp(S)) = Clpp(S).
Furthermore, by using Clpp(S) instead of just S , one guarantees that under grounded semantics the postulates
closure (Postulate 1), direct consistency (Postulate 2) and indirect consistency (Postulate 3) are warranted for the
ASPIC system.
Theorem 1. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from the defeasible theory 〈Clpp(S),D〉 such that
Clpp(S) is consistent. Output is its set of justified conclusions and E its grounded extension. Then, 〈Arg,defeat〉
satisfies closure and indirect consistency.
To illustrate how Clpp works, consider again Example 4.
Example 4 (continued). Let S = {−→ wr;−→ go;m −→ hw;b −→ ¬hw} and D = {wr 	⇒ m;go 	⇒ b}.
Under 〈Clpp(S),D〉 the following arguments can be constructed:
A1: [→ wr]
A2: [→ go]
A3: [A1 ⇒ m]
A4: [A2 ⇒ b]
A5: [A3 → hw]
A6: [A4 → ¬hw]
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A8: [A6 → ¬m] (using the rule ¬hw −→ ¬m)
Now the argument A3 has a defeater which is A8. Since A8 also defeats A3, the two arguments will not be in the
grounded extension. Consequently, m is no longer a justified conclusion. Similarly, the two arguments A4 and A7
are conflicting. Therefore, b is not justified either. Thus, only the premises wr and go are considered justified in this
example.
The previous example illustrates that, although the closure of strict rules under Clpp operator solves the issue
of closure and indirect consistency under grounded semantics, the problem is still open for the other acceptability
semantics (like complete and preferred semantics). This can be seen by again examining the example of “Married
John”.
Example 4 (continued). As said before, the argument A4 has a unique defeater which is A7 and A3 has one defeater
which is A8. However, A4 defeats A7 and A3 defeats A8. Thus, the set {A3,A4} is an admissible extension since
it defends itself against all its defeaters (A7,A8). And because {A3, A4} is admissible, there also exists a preferred
extension (a superset of {A3, A4}) with conclusions b and also m. This means that this preferred extension does not
satisfy closure. Moreover, the closure under the strict rules of its conclusions is inconsistent. However, note that since
we are using a skeptical reasoning, neither m nor ¬m (resp. neither b nor ¬b) can be inferred from this theory. Thus,
the problem concerns only the results returned by individual extensions, and not the output of the system.
To solve this problem, an alteration to the core formalism is necessary, in particular to the notion of rebutting. The
idea is to consider a restricted notion of rebutting so that an argument can only be rebutted on the consequent of one
of its defeasible rules. This can be stated as follows:
Definition 15 (Restricted rebutting). Let A and B be arguments. A restrictively rebuts B on (A′,B ′) iff A′ ∈ Sub(A)
such that Conc(A′) = φ and B ′ ∈ Sub(B) such that B ′ is of the form B ′′1 , . . . ,B ′′n ⇒ −φ.
Note that the restricted version of rebut is a special case of the unrestricted version of rebut.
Property 4. Let A and B be arguments. If A restrictively rebuts B , then A rebuts B . The reverse is not always true.
Let us consider the following counter-example:
Example 4 (continued). In the previous example, the argument A4 rebuts A7, but A4 does not restrictively rebuts A7.
We now consider the following argumentation system: 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 such that Defeatr is defined as follows:
Definition 16 (Restricted Defeating). Let A and B be arguments. We say that A defeatsr B iff
(1) A restrictively rebuts B , or
(2) A undercuts B .
Before showing how restricted rebut can help to solve the issue of postulates, let us first introduce an important
result. In fact, it can be verified that when “restricted rebutting” is used instead of “rebutting”,3 then the argumentation
formalism immediately satisfies closure, without the need to compute any closure of the set S . On the other hand,
when “rebutting” is used, it is direct consistency that is immediately satisfied, as shown by Property 2.
3 Applying “restricted rebutting” instead of (unrestricted) “rebutting” also affects the validity of some of the results that have been obtained
until now. Proposition 2, for instance, is not valid under restricted rebutting (Theorems 2 and 4 will repair this). Proposition 1, however, can also
quite easily be proved under restricted rebutting. Furthermore, results that do not depend on the particular way in which defeat is defined (like
Propositions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) remain valid under restricted rebutting.
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extensions. Then, 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 satisfies closure.
Now let us consider again the problem of Example 4.
Example 4 (continued). Using the restricted version of defeat, the argument A4 does not defeat A7 and A3 does not
defeat A8. Thus, the set {A3,A4} is no longer an admissible extension since it does not defend itself against all its
defeaters (A7,A8).
We will now show that if we consider the Clpp operator and the “restricted rebutting” then the two remaining
postulates (closure and indirect consistency) are satisfied under each of Dung’s standard semantics.
Theorem 2. Let 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 be an argumentation system built from the theory 〈Clpp(S),D〉 such that S is consis-
tent, Output its set of justified conclusions and E1, . . . ,En its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics.
Then, 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 satisfies direct consistency and indirect consistency.
In the previous example, it can be seen that Clpp can generate a rule (in this case: ¬hw −→ ¬m) that is needed to
obtain an intuitive outcome. As a side effect, Clpp also generates many rules that are not actually needed to obtain the
intuitive outcome. An example of such a rule is b −→ ¬m, which corresponds to applying transitivity on the rules
b −→ ¬hw and ¬hw −→ ¬m. Worse yet, Clpp may also generate rules which are actually harmful for obtaining an
intuitive outcome. An example of such a rule is p,¬p −→ ¬q . To see why this is harmful, consider the case of two
arguments for conflicting conclusions (like the Nixon diamond) p and ¬p. With strict rules as classical entailment, one
can then combine these arguments to form an argument that can defeat an arbitrary statement (like q), as p,¬p  ¬q .
This phenomenon is particularly problematic under grounded semantics [39,40] but also plays a role under preferred
semantics [22]. Although an approach is given in [22] we will not go into details here.
5.2. Strict rules closed under transposition
In the light of the above, one can observe that the approach of computing the closure of a set of strict rules requires
a closure operator that generates at least those rules that are needed to satisfy closure and consistency, but at the same
time does generate rules which can be used to build new arguments that may keep “good” arguments from becoming
acceptable, and consequently keep their conclusions from becoming justified. In other words, the closure operator
should not generate too little, but it should not generate too much either.
We are now about to define a second closure operator Cltp that is significantly weaker than our first one (Clpp). Our
discussion starts with the observation that a strict rule (say φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ ), when translated to propositional logic
(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn ⊃ ψ ) is equivalent to a disjunction (¬φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬φn ∨ ψ ). In this disjunction, different literals can be
put in front (like ¬φi in ¬φ1 ∨ · · · ∨¬φi−1 ∨ψ ∨¬φi+1 ∨ · · · ∨¬φn ∨¬φi ), which can again be translated to a strict
rule (φ1, . . . , φi−1,¬ψ,φi+1, . . . , φn −→ ¬φi ). This leads to the following definition.
Definition 17 (Transposition). A strict rule s is a transposition of φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ iff s = φ1, . . . , φi−1,¬ψ,φi+1,
. . . , φn −→ ¬φi for some 1 i  n.
Based on the thus defined notion of transposition, we now define our second closure operator.
Definition 18 (Transposition operator). Let S be a set of strict rules. Cltp(S) is a minimal set such that:
• S ⊆ Cltp(S), and
• If s ∈ Cltp(S) and t is a transposition of s then t ∈ Cltp(S).
We say that S is closed under transposition iff Cltp(S) = S .
It is easily verified that with the Cltp operator, Example 4 (Married John) is handled correctly. More generally, the
use of such an operator allows the three rationality postulates to be satisfied.
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Output its set of justified conclusions and E its grounded extension. Then, 〈Arg,Defeat〉 satisfies closure and indi-
rect consistency.
Note that 〈Arg,Defeat〉 satisfies also consistency (according to Property 2) since the unrestricted version of the
rebutting relation is considered here. As for the Clpp operator, the Cltp operator by itself is not enough to guarantee
the closure and indirect consistency of an argumentation system for the other acceptability semantics (like complete
and preferred semantics). Let us consider another example to illustrate this issue.
Example 7. Let S = {−→ a;−→ b;−→ c;−→ g;d, e, f −→ ¬g} and D = {a 	⇒ d;b 	⇒ e; c 	⇒ f }.
Now, consider the following arguments:
A1 : [[→ a] ⇒ d]
A2 : [[→ b] ⇒ e]
A3 : [[→ c] ⇒ f ]
One can easily verify that without Cltp, the arguments A1, A2 and A3 do not have any counter-arguments (which
makes them members of each Dung-style extension). However, if one would replace the defeasible theory 〈S,D〉 by
〈Cltp(S),D〉, then counter-arguments against A1, A2 and A3 do exist. For instance, A4 = [[[→ b] ⇒ e], [[→ c] ⇒
f ], [→ g] → ¬d] defeats A1 (because e, f, g −→ ¬d ∈ Cltp(S)).
The counter-arguments against A1, A2 and A3 make sure that, under grounded semantics, neither d , e nor f is
justified. At the same time, however, it must be observed that the set {A1, A2, A3} is admissible. Even though A4
defeats A1, A1 also defeats A4, and similar observations can also be made with respect to A2 and A3. And because
{A1, A2, A3} is admissible, there also exists a preferred extension (a superset of {A1, A2, A3}) with conclusions d , e,
f and also g. This means that this preferred extension does not satisfy closure. Moreover, the closure under the strict
rules of its conclusions is inconsistent.
So, while the closure of strict rules under transposition solves the issue of closure and indirect consistency under
grounded semantics, the problem is still open for preferred semantics. For this, we will consider again the argumenta-
tion system 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 with the restricted version of rebutting.
To see how the restricted rebut can help to solve the issue of postulates, consider again the problem of Example 7.
Example 7 (continued). Again consider the following arguments:
A1 : [[→ a] ⇒ d]
A2 : [[→ b] ⇒ e]
A3 : [[→ c] ⇒ f ]
Under the restricted version of rebutting, it holds that {A1,A2,A3} is not an admissible set under 〈Cltp(S),D〉. For
instance, the argument [[[→ b] ⇒ e], [[→ c] ⇒ f ], [→ g] → ¬d] (A4) now rebuts A1 but A1 does not rebut A4, nor
does any other argument in {A1,A2,A3} defeat A4. Thus {A1,A2,A3} is not admissible in 〈Cltp(S),D〉 under the
restricted definition of rebutting.
We will now show that if we consider the transposition closure Cltp and the restricted version of the rebutting
relation then direct and indirect consistency are satisfied under each of Dung’s standard semantics.
Theorem 4. Let 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 be an argumentation system built from the theory 〈Cltp(S),D〉 with S is consistent.
Output its set of justified conclusions and E1, . . . ,En its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics. Then,
〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 satisfies direct consistency and indirect consistency.
Note that 〈Arg,Defeat〉 satisfies also closure as shown by Proposition 8 in Appendix A.
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Consistency and closure with the two closure operators
Type of rebutting Direct consistency Indirect consistency Closure
Rebut Under any Under grounded Under grounded
semantics extension extension
Restricted Rebut Under any Under any Under any
semantics semantics semantics
5.3. Conclusions
So far, we have proposed two solutions for satisfying the three rationality postulates for the argumentation frame-
work proposed in [4]. Table 2 summarizes the different results obtained concerning direct consistency, indirect
consistency and closure. In what follows, we will use the wording “any extension” in order to refer to all Dung’s
standard semantics.
6. Summary and discussion
Although various systems for formal argumentation have been defined during recent years, many of them can easily
produce results that, when given a closer inspection, are very problematic to serve as a basis for beliefs, or for any
other purpose that allows for introspection on the results.
In order to avoid such problems, the aim of this paper is to define a number of postulates that any argumentation
system should satisfy. These postulates should warrant that an argumentation formalism is well-defined and guarantee
some basic suitability of its outputs. We have focused on three important postulates: the closure, the direct consistency
and the indirect consistency of the results of a system. These are violated by several argumentation systems such as
[33,34,42]. We then studied ways in which these postulates can be warranted for an instantiation of the Dung system. In
particular, we have proposed two closure operators that allow to make more explicit some implicit information. Thus,
the contribution of this paper is not to state an entirely new formalism for argumentation and defeasible reasoning.
Instead, we have stated a number of general approaches (like transposition) that can be applied to a wide variety of
argumentation formalisms, including [4,33,34,42].
It should be mentioned that the problem of rationality postulates is not necessarily connected to argumentation
formalisms that use Dung-style semantics. For instance, as was explained in Section 3, the formalism of [33] violates
the rationality postulates of closure and indirect consistency, even though it does not use any of Dung’s standard
semantics. The point is that many of the problematic examples, as discussed in Section 3 arise because some arguments
do not have counterarguments (like is for instance the case in the Married John example), although intuitively they
should have. In almost all semantics that we know of, such arguments without defeaters are in each extension; this is
not only the case for the standard semantics (i.e. grounded, preferred, complete and stable), but also for semi-stable
[24], ideal [1] and CF2 [13].
As for the proposed solutions, in Section 5 it was stated that the approach of transposition (Cltp) in combination
with restricted rebutting satisfies the rationality postulates for any of Dung’s standard semantics. Actually, one could
even generalize this result. As the proof of Theorem 4 works for each semantics of which the extensions are a non-
empty subset of the complete extensions, this not only includes preferred, complete or grounded semantics, but also for
instance ideal semantics [1] or even relatively new approaches like semi-stable semantics [24]. For all these semantics,
the approach of transposition in combination with restricted rebutting satisfies the rationality postulates discussed in
this paper.
Although in most of this paper, the rationality postulates are discussed using Dung’s analysis of formal argumen-
tation [28], it should be mentioned that the issue of rationality postulates is not necessarily bound to it. In fact, the
rationality postulates are applicable to any formalism for defeasible reasoning (be it argumentation or a more tra-
ditional nonmonotonic logic) that uses a knowledge base containing strict and defeasible rules to entail extensions
with associated conclusions. This includes approaches like [39] and [33]. The reason why we have selected Dung’s
approach to illustrate some of the problems is mainly because it is relatively well-known among researchers in formal
argumentation and nonmonotonic logic.
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of propositional closure (Clpp) involves the usual issues of computational complexity that are associated with propo-
sitional logic, the approach of transposition (Cltp) can be seen as a more lightweight approach. It should be observed
that a strict rule has at most k transpositions, where k is the size of its body. If we assume that a set S of n strict rules
has an average body size of k then this generates at most n times k transpositions of S . Thus, generating the necessary
transpositions is a task that is linear to the size of S . Experiences from the first experimental implementations4 using
Cltp indicate that the added computational complexity from transposition does not cause any serious problems.
At a first sight, the rationality postulate of closure seems to require the property of logical omniscience, but this is
not necessarily the case. The point is that an implementation of an argumentation formalism may very well be query-
based. For semantics like grounded, complete or preferred, it is very well possible to answer the question whether a
formula p follows from at least one extension, or even from every extension [42,46] without actually computing all
extensions under the semantics in question. With the query-based approach, logical omniscience is not an issue since
one only generates the conclusions and arguments that one actually needs in order to answer a query.
The approach of closing the strict rules under transposition (Cltp) is to some extent comparable with the approach
of Clark completion for logic programs [27]. Both make explicit information that was left implicit in the original
formalization. The difference, however, is that Clark completion is related to the Closed World Assumption. That is, if
something does not follow from the knowledge base, then it is assumed not to hold. Transposition, on the other hand,
is based on the idea that something may not be explicitly in the original knowledge base, but it still should be assumed
to hold since it logically follows from this knowledge base.
A topic related to the one discussed in the current paper is whether one can state rationality postulates not so much
with respect to the conclusions of the argumentation formalism, but with respect to the argument-based semantics
applied by it. It is interesting to see that this topic has caught some recent attention. Caminada, for instance, is
able to capture the traditional Dung-style semantics (grounded, preferred, complete and stable) as well as the newly
invented semi-stable semantics essentially in one postulate [23]. Baroni and Giacomin apply a total of nine postulates
with which they are able not only to evaluate the traditional Dung-style semantics, but also non admissibility based
semantics, such as CF2 [13]. Thus, the approach of applying postulates in formal argumentation has many useful
applications.
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Appendix A
The following two lemmas follow directly from [28].
Lemma 1. Let 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation framework and B ⊆A. If B is admissible, then B ⊆ F(B).
Proof. Suppose that B is admissible. Now take an arbitrary argument A ∈ B. As A is defended by B (because B is
admissible), it is also in F(B). Therefore, B ⊆F(B). 
Lemma 2. Let 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation framework and B ⊆A. If B is admissible, then F(B) is also admissible.
Proof. Suppose B is admissible. In order to prove that F(B) is also admissible, we have to prove two things:
4 See http://aspic.acl.icnet.uk/.
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Suppose F(B) is not conflict-free. That is, there exists some A,B ∈ F(B) such that A defeats B . The fact that
B ∈ F(B) means that B must defend B against A. That is, B contains some C that defeats A. But the fact that
A ∈F(B) means that B must defend A against C. Therefore, B must contain some D that defeats C. But then B
would not be conflict-free. Contradiction.
(2) For each A ∈F(B): A is defended by F(B).
This follows almost immediately from Lemma 1. 
Proposition 1. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system and E1, . . . ,En its different extensions under one of
Dung’s standard semantics. ∀Ei ∈ {E1, . . . ,En}, ∀A ∈ Ei , Sub(A) ⊆ Ei .
Proof. As every complete, grounded or preferred extension is also a complete extension, we only have to prove this
under complete semantics. Let E be a complete extension. Suppose that A ∈ E and A′ ∈ Sub(A). Suppose also that
A′ /∈ E. Since E is a complete extension, then this means that either E ∪ {A′} is not conflict-free, or E does not
defend A′.
Case 1: Suppose that E ∪ {A′} is not conflict-free. This means that ∃B ∈ E such that B defeats A′, or A′ defeats B .
Suppose that B defeats A′, thus, B rebuts A′ or B undercuts A′ on A′′ ∈ Sub(A′). However, A′′ ∈ Sub(A).
This means that B defeats A to. This means that E is not conflict-free. Contradiction with the fact that E is
a complete extension.
Suppose that A′ defeats B , thus, A′ rebuts B or A′ undercuts B on B ′ ∈ Sub(B). This means also that A
defeats B on B ′ since A′ ∈ Sub(A) and B ′ ∈ Sub(B) (according to the definitions of Rebutting and Under-
cutting). This means that E is not conflict-free. Contradiction with the fact that E is a complete extension.
Case 2: Suppose that E does not defend A′. This means that ∃B ∈Arg such that B defeats A′ on some A′′ ∈ Sub(A′)
and C ∈ E such that C defeats B . Since A′′ ∈ Sub(A) it holds that B defeats A. Since E is a complete
extension and A ∈ E, then E defends A against B . Contradiction. 
Proposition 2. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from a theory 〈S,D〉 with S consistent, and
E1, . . . ,En its different extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics. Concs(Ei) is consistent for each 1 
i  n.
Proof. Let E be a complete extension. Suppose that {Conc(A) | A ∈ E} is inconsistent. This means that ∃A,B ∈
E,Conc(A) = −Conc(B). Since E is a complete extension, E is conflict-free. This means that A does not defeat B
and B does not defeat A. According to the definition of defeat, this means that A does not rebut B and B does not re-
but A. Consequently, A and B are strict arguments (according to the definition of rebutting). Thus, StrictRules(A)
∪ StrictRules(B) is inconsistent. However, StrictRules(A) ∪ StrictRules(B) ⊆ S , and S is consistent.
Contradiction. 
Proposition 3. Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Let E1, . . . ,En be
its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics, and Output be as in Definition 12.
If Concs(Ei) is consistent for each 1 i  n then Output is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that ∀Ei , {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} is consistent. Suppose also that Output is inconsistent. According to
Definition 6 this means that ∃ψ,−ψ ∈ Output. According to Definition 12, it holds that ∀Ei , ∃Ai,Bi ∈ Ei such that
Conc(Ai) = ψ and Conc(Bi) = −ψ . This means that ∀Ei , {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} is inconsistent. Contradiction. 
Proposition 4. Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Let E1, . . . ,En be
its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics, and Output be as in Definition 12.
If Concs(Ei) = ClS(Concs(Ei) for each 1 i  n then Output= ClS(Output).
Proof. Suppose that ∀Ei , {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} = ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}). Suppose also that Output =
ClS(Output) then ∃ψ ∈ ClS(Output) such that ψ /∈ Output.
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Since φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Output then for each φk (1 k  n) it holds that ∀Ei , ∃Aj ∈ Ei with Conc(Aj ) =
φk .
Then ∀Ei , φ1, . . . , φn ∈ {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}.
However, ∀Ei , {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} = ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}). This means that ∀Ei , ψ ∈ {Conc(A) |
A ∈ Ei}. Consequently, ψ ∈ Output. Contradiction.
Case 2: By induction, the above reasoning is generalized to the case where φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ClS(Output). 
Proposition 5. Let T be a defeasible theory, 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system built from T . Let E1, . . . ,En be
its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics and let Output be as in Definition 12.
If ClS({Concs(Ei)}) is consistent for each 1 i  n, then ClS(Output) is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that ∀Ei , ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}) is consistent. Suppose also that ClS(Output) is inconsistent.
This means that ∃ψ,−ψ ∈ ClS(Output).
Case 1: ∃ψ,−ψ ∈ ClS(Output) means that ∃φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ ∈ S such that φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Output and
∃φ′1, . . . , φ′m −→ −ψ ∈ S such that φ′1, . . . , φ′m ∈ Output. This means that φ1, . . . , φn,φ′1, . . . , φ′m ∈{Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}, ∀Ei . As a consequence, ψ,−ψ ∈ ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}). This means that
ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}) is inconsistent. Contradiction.
Case 2: ∃ψ,−ψ ∈ ClS(Output) means that ∃φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ ∈ S such that φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ClS(Output) and
∃φ′1, . . . , φ′m −→ −ψ ∈ S such that φ′1, . . . , φ′m ∈ ClS(Output).
By induction, we apply the reasoning of case 1. 
Proposition 6. If an argumentation system 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies indirect consistency, then it also satisfies direct consis-
tency.
Proof. According to Definition 5, Output ⊆ ClS(Output). Therefore, if ClS(Output) is consistent, then
Output is also consistent. Similarly, since {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} ⊆ ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}), then if ClS({Conc(A) |
A ∈ Ei}) is consistent, then {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} is also consistent. Consequently, if an argumentation system satisfies
indirect consistency, then it also satisfies direct consistency. 
Proposition 7. Let 〈A,Def 〉 be an argumentation system. If 〈A,Def 〉 satisfies closure and direct consistency, then it
also satisfies indirect consistency.
Proof. Suppose that the argumentation system satisfies closure, then Output = ClS(Output). Suppose also that
the system satisfies direct consistency, then Output is consistent. Consequently, ClS(Output) is also consistent.
Similarly, we have {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} = ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}) (due to the closure of the system). Moreover,
{Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} is consistent (because of direct consistency). Thus, ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}) is also consistent.
Consequently, the system satisfies indirect consistency. 
Lemma 3. Let P be a set of propositions that is closed under propositional entailment (that is: Cn(P ) = P ). It holds
that Cn(Prop(Rules(P ))) = P .
Proof. We have to prove two things:
(1) Cn(Prop(Rules(P ) ⊆ P
First of all, it should be mentioned that from the definitions of Prop and Rules it follows that Prop(Rules(P )) ⊆ P .
As in propositional logic Cn is a monotonic function, it also holds that Cn(Prop(Rules(P ))) ⊆ Cn(P ). As we have
that Cn(P ) = P , it also holds that Cn(Prop(Rules(P ))) ⊆ P .
(2) P ⊆ Cn(Prop(Rules(P )))
Let φ ∈ P . Let φCNF be a proposition in Conjunctive Normal Form that is logically equivalent to φ. As-
sume, without loss of generality, that φCNF is of the form (p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn) ∧ · · · ∧ (q1 ∨ · · · ∨ qm). As P
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mulas ¬p1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬pn−1 ⊃ pn, . . . ,¬q1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬qm−1 ⊃ qm. These formulas, by definition of Rules and
Prop, will also be in Prop(Rules(P )). Together, these formulas entail φCNF and therefore also φ. Therefore,
φ ∈ Cn(Prop(Rules(P ))). 
Property 3. Let S be a set of strict rules, and let S1,S2 ⊆ S .
(1) S ⊆ Clpp(S);
(2) if S1 ⊆ S2 then Clpp(S1) ⊆ Clpp(S2);
(3) Clpp(Clpp(S)) = Clpp(S).
Proof.
(1) S ⊆ Clpp(S). This follows directly from Definition 14.
(2) If S1 ⊆ S2 then Clpp(S1) ⊆ Clpp(S2).
Since S1 ⊆ S2 then Prop(S1) ⊆ Prop(S2) (according to Definition 14 of the function Prop). Due to the mono-
tonicity of the classical inference relation , we have Cnprop(Prop(S1)) ⊆ Cnprop(P rop(S2)). According to the
definition of the function Rules in Definition 14, we have Rules(Cnprop(Prop(S1))) ⊆ Rules(Cnprop(Prop(S2))).
Thus, Clpp(S1) ⊆ Clpp(S2).
(3) Clpp(Clpp(S)) = Clpp(S).
From the definition of Clpp it follows that:
Clpp(Clpp(S)) = Rules(Cn(Prop(Rules(Cn(Prop(S)))))).
As Cn(Prop(S)) is closed under propositional consequence, we can apply Lemma 3. From this, it follows that:
Rules(Cn(Prop(Rules(Cn(Prop(S)))))) = Rules(Cn(Prop(S))).
Applying the definition of Clpp yields: Rules(Cn(Prop(S))) = Clpp(S) .
By applying transitivity on the thus derived equations, we obtain: Clpp(Clpp(S)) = Clpp(S). 
Lemma 4. Let S be a set of strict rules. Clpp(S) is closed under transposition. That is: Cltp(Clpp(S)) = Clpp(S).
Proof. We have to prove two things:
(1) Clpp(S) ⊆ Cltp(Clpp(S)). This follows directly from Definition 18.
(2) Cltp(Clpp(S)) ⊆ Clpp(S). Let s ∈ Cltp(Clpp(S)). Then, according to Definition 18, there are two possibilities:
(a) s ∈ Clpp(S). In that case, we’re done.
(b) s is a transposition of some rule s′ ∈ Clpp(S). Let s′ = φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ and s = φ1, . . . , φi−1,−ψ,φi+1,
. . . , φn −→ −φi . From the fact that s′ ∈ Clpp(S) it follows that s ∈ Clpp(Clpp(S)) (this is because φ1 ∧ · · · ∧
φn ⊃ ψ  φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φi−1 ∧ −ψ ∧ φi+1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn ⊃ −φi ). From Property 3 (Clpp(Clpp(S)) = Clpp(S)) it
then follows that s ∈ Clpp(S). 
Theorem 1. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from the defeasible theory 〈Clpp(S),D〉 such that
Clpp(S) is consistent. Output is its set of justified conclusions and E its grounded extension.
〈Arg,Defeat〉 satisfies closure and indirect consistency.
Proof. From Lemma 4 it follows that 〈Clpp(S),D〉 = 〈Cltp(Clpp(S)),D〉. From Theorem 1 it follows that the argu-
mentation system 〈Arg,Defeat〉 built from 〈Cltp(Clpp(S)),D〉 satisfies closure and indirect consistency. 
Property 4. Let A and B be arguments. If A restrictively rebuts B , then A rebuts B . The reverse is not always true.
Proof. Let A and B be arguments. Suppose that A restrictively rebuts B . This means that ∃A′ ∈ Sub(A) with
Conc(A′) = φ and ∃B ′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form B ′′1 , . . . ,B ′′n ⇒ −φ. B ′ is a non-strict argument, moreover, Conc(B ′) =−φ. Thus, A rebuts B . 
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plete extensions. 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 satisfies closure.
Proof. In order to prove closure, it is sufficient to show that ∀Ei , {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} = ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei}).
Because, according to Proposition 4, this means that Output = ClS(Output). Consequently, the argumentation
system satisfies both aspects of closure (Proposition 4).
Let E be a complete extension. Suppose that {Conc(A) | A ∈ E} = ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ E}). This means that
there exist arguments A1, . . . ,An ∈ E with Conc(A1) = φ1, . . . ,Conc(An) = φn and ∃φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ ∈ S , but
A = A1, . . . ,An → ψ /∈ E. Two possible cases exist:
Case 1: E ∪ {A} is not conflict-free. Then either ∃B ∈ E such that B defeats A, or ∃B ∈ E such that A defeats B .
Suppose that ∃B ∈ E such that B defeats A on a sub-argument A′. Thus, A′ ∈ Sub(A). However, Sub(A) =
Sub(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}. According to the definition of restricted rebutting and that of undercut,
the top rule of A′ is defeasible. Thus, A′ ∈ Sub(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub(An). Then, A′ ∈ Sub(A1), or . . . , or
A′ ∈ Sub(An). According to Proposition 1, since Ai ∈ E (1  i  n), then Sub(Ai) ⊆ E (1  i  n).
Consequently, A′ ∈ E. Thus, B defeats A′ (according to the definition of rebutting and undercut). Thus, E is
not conflict-free. Contradiction.
Now suppose that ∃B ∈ E such that A defeats B . As E is an admissible set, it must defend itself against A.
This can only be the case if E contains some argument C such that C defeats A1 or . . . or An (this is because
C cannot defeat A on A’s top-rule). But then E would not be conflict-free. Contradiction.
Case 2: E does not defend A. This means that ∃B ∈ Arg such that B defeats A and C ∈ E such that C defeats
B . Since B defeats A, it must hold that B rebuts or undercut A on a sub-argument A′ whose top rule is
defeasible. Thus, B rebuts or undercut A′. However, since A′ ∈ Sub(A), it must hold that A′ ∈ Sub(A1) ∪
· · · ∪ Sub(An). Then, ∃i = 1, . . . , n such that A′ ∈ Sub(Ai). According to Proposition 1, since Ai ∈ E, then
Sub(Ai) ⊆ E, thus, A′ ∈ E. Consequently, A′ is defended by E against B . Contradiction. 
Theorem 2. Let 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 be an argumentation system built from the theory 〈Clpp(S),D〉 with S is consistent,
Output its set of justified conclusions and E1, . . . ,En its complete extensions.
〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 satisfies direct consistency and indirect consistency.
Proof. From Lemma 4 it follows that 〈Clpp(S),D〉 = 〈Cltp(Clpp(S)),D〉. From Theorem 4, it follows that the argu-
mentation system built from 〈Cltp(Clpp(S),D〉 satisfies direct consistency and indirect consistency. 
In order to prove Theorem 3, in particular Closure, we need first to prove the following result:
Lemma 5. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from the defeasible theory 〈Cltp(S),D〉. Let B be an
admissible set of arguments under this theory. If the set {Conc(A) such that A ∈ B} is closed, then the set {Conc(A)
such that A ∈F(B)} is closed as well.
Proof. Let B be an admissible set of arguments. Suppose that {Conc(A) such that A ∈ B} is closed, and that
{Conc(A) such that A ∈ F(B)} is not closed. The fact that {Conc(A) such that A ∈ F(B)} is not closed means
that there exists some rule φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ such that F(B) contains arguments A1, . . . ,An with Conc(A1) =
φ1, . . . ,Conc(An) = φn but no argument with conclusion ψ . Now consider the argument A = A1, . . . ,An → ψ .
It holds that A /∈ F(B). This means that A is defeated by some argument (say B) that is not defeated by B. The fact
that A1, . . . ,An ∈F(B) means that B does not defeat A1, . . . ,An. Therefore, B must have conclusion −ψ .
Now, let Ai be an arbitrary element of {A1, . . . ,An} (1  i  n) containing at least one defeasible rule (such
an argument always exists, since otherwise B could not defeat A). Let B ′i = A1, . . . ,Ai−1,B,Ai+1, . . . ,An →−Conc(Ai) (such an argument can be constructed as Cltp(S) is closed under transposition). The fact that Ai ∈ F(B)
means that B contains some argument (say A′1) against B ′i . This A′i cannot defeat any of A1, . . . ,An (otherwise F(B)
wouldn’t be conflict-free, since it contains A1, . . . ,An as well as A′ (since B ⊆ F(B) for an admissible set B)), nor
does A′i defeat B (since our assumption is that B contains no defeaters of B). Therefore, the only way for A′i to defeat
B ′ is to rebut −Conc(Ai). That is, A′ has the same conclusion as Ai .i i
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defeasible rule, B contains an argument A′i with the same conclusion, and for each Ai without any defeasible rule, B
contains Ai (since Ai is strict and B is assumed to be closed under strict rules). But the fact that B is closed under
strict rules means that B also contains an argument (say C) with Conc(C) = ψ . Therefore (as B ⊆F(B)), F(B) also
contains C. Contradiction. 
Theorem 3. Let 〈Arg,Defeat〉 be an argumentation system built from the defeasible theory 〈Cltp(S),D〉 such that
Cltp(S) is consistent. Output is its set of justified conclusions and E its grounded extension. 〈Arg,Defeat〉 satisfies
closure and indirect consistency.
Proof.
Closure: In order to prove closure, it is sufficient to show that {Conc(A) | A ∈ E} = ClS({Conc(A) | A ∈ E}).
This is because, under grounded semantics, there exists exactly one grounded extension. Output =
ClS(Output). Consequently, the argumentation system satisfies closure.
Let E be the grounded extension, thus E =
⋃i1F(∅). We prove this by induction using the inductive
definition of grounded semantics. Let A0 = ∅ and Ai+1 =F(Ai ) (i  0).
basis (i = 1) Let A1 be the set of all arguments that do not have defeaters. We now prove that A1 is an
admissible set that satisfies closure.
Admissible The set of all arguments that do not have any defeaters is automatically admissible.
Closure Suppose the conclusions of A1 are not closed under strict rules. Then there exists a strict
rule φ1, . . . , φn −→ ψ such that A1 contains arguments A1, . . . ,An with Conc(A1) =
φ1, . . . ,Conc(An) = φn but no argument with conclusion ψ . Now consider the argument
A = A1, . . . ,An → ψ . It holds that A /∈ A. This means that A has a defeater (say B).
But B does not defeat A1, . . . ,An (as the fact that A1, . . . ,An ∈ A means they have no
defeaters). Therefore, the only way B can defeat A is by having a conclusion ¬ψ . It must
hold that at least one of A1, . . . ,An contains a defeasible rule (otherwise A would be strict
and have no defeaters). Let Ai ∈ {A1, . . . ,An} be an argument containing at least one
defeasible rule. The fact that Cltp(S) is closed under transposition means that Cltp(S) also
contains a rule φ1, . . . , φn−1,¬ψ,φi+1, . . . , φn −→ ¬φi . The argument A1, . . . ,Ai−1,B,
Ai+1, . . . ,An → ¬φi is now a rebutter of Ai . Contradiction.
step (i  1) Let us assume that Ai (i  1) is admissible and closed. We will now prove that Ai+1
(= F(Ai )) is admissible and closed.
Admissible: This follows directly from Lemma 2.
Closure: This follows directly from Lemma 5.
Indirect Consistency: Since the argumentation system satisfies closure (above) and direct consistency (Proposition 2),
then according to Proposition 7, then it also satisfies indirect consistency. 
Before treating Theorem 4, we first have to give some additional terminology that is used in the proof of Theorem 4
as well as in the proof of Lemma 6.
First, we define the depth of an argument.
Definition 19. Let A be an argument. The depth of A (depth(A)) is:
• 1, if A is an atomic argument, or else
• 1 + depth(A′), where A′ is a direct subargument of A such that depth(A′) is maximal.
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an argument. In that case, the definition below simply takes the rule with the smallest depth.
Definition 20. Let A be an argument and r be a rule applied in the construction of A. We say that the depth of r in A
(depth(r,A)) is:
• 0, if r is the top-rule of A, or else
• 1 + depth(r,A′), where A′ is a direct subargument of A such that depth(r,A′) is minimal.
The next thing to define is when two subarguments are at equal level in some superargument. Again, an issue
is what to do when a subargument is contained in a superargument more than once. The approach of the following
definition is to see if we can find some occurrence of a subargument A1 that is at the same level as some occurrence
of a subargument A2.
Definition 21. Let A1 and A2 be arguments and A′1 ∈ Sub(A1) and A′2 ∈ Sub(A2). We say that A′1 is at the same
level in A1 as A′2 in A2 iff:
• A′1 is a direct subargument of A1, and A′2 is a direct subargument of A2, or else• there exists a direct subargument A′′1 of A1 and a direct subargument A′′2 of A2 such that A′1 ∈ Sub(A′′1) and
A′2 ∈ Sub(A′′2), and A′1 is at the same level in A′′1 as A′2 in A′′2.
We say that A1 is at the same level as A2 in A iff A1 is at the same level in A as A2 in A.
To illustrate the above definitions, consider the argument A = [[[→ c] → d], [→ a], [[→ a] → b] → e]. Here,
depth(A) = 3, depth(−→ a,A) = 1, depth(−→ c,A) = 2, and the arguments [→ a] and [→ c] are at the same level
in A.
Before proving Theorem 4, namely its part concerning direct consistency, we first need to prove the following
result:
Lemma 6. Let (S,D) be a defeasible theory where S is closed under transposition, Ass be a nonempty set of assump-
tions (that is, a set of strict rules with empty antecedents {−→ a1, . . . ,−→ an}) and A be a strict argument under
(S ∪ Ass,D) such that A has conclusion c and contains the atomic subarguments [→ a1], . . . , [→ an]. There exists a
strict argument B under (S ∪ Ass ∪ {−→ −c},D) such that B has conclusion −ai (1 i  n).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the depth of A.
basis Let us assume that the depth of A is 1. In that case, A consists of a single rule, with empty antecedent. As the
set of assumptions that is used in A is non-empty, it follows that this rule must be an assumption of the form
−→ a. Therefore, the conclusion of A is a (that is: c = a). Then, trivially, there also exists a strict argument
B (with B = [→ −a]) under (S ∪ Ass ∪ {−→ −a},D) such that B has conclusion −a.
step Suppose the above lemma holds for all strict arguments of depth  j . We now prove that it also holds
for all strict arguments of depth j + 1. Let A be a strict argument under (S ∪ Ass,D) of depth j + 1
with conclusion c. Let Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(Am) −→ c be the top-rule of A. Let Ai be a direct subar-
gument of A that contains the assumption ai . Because S is closed under transposition, there exists a rule
Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(Ai−1),−c,Conc(Ai+1), . . . ,Conc(Am) −→ −Conc(Ai). The fact that Ai has a
depth  j means that we can apply the induction hypothesis. That is, there exists a strict argument (say B ′)
under (S ∪ Ass ∪ {−→ −Conc(Ai)},D) with conclusion −ai . Now, in B ′, substitute −Conc(Ai) by the
subargument [A1, . . . ,Ai−1,−c,Ai+1, . . .Am → −Conc(Ai)]. The resulting argument (call it B) is a strict
argument under (S ∪ Ass ∪ {−→ −c},D) with conclusion −ai . 
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Theorem 4. Let 〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 be an argumentation system built from the theory 〈Cltp(S),D〉 with Cltp(S) is consis-
tent. Output its set of justified conclusions and E1, . . . ,En its extensions under one of Dung’s standard semantics.
〈Arg,Defeatr 〉 satisfies direct consistency and indirect consistency.
Proof.
Direct Consistency: In order to prove consistency, it is sufficient to show that ∀Ei , {Conc(A) | A ∈ Ei} is consis-
tent. This is because Proposition 3 would then imply that Output is also consistent. Consequently, the
argumentation system satisfies consistency.
Let E be a complete extension. Suppose the conclusions of E are not consistent. Then E contains an
argument (say A) with conclusion c and an argument (say B) with conclusion −c. As Cltp(S) is assumed
to be consistent, at least one of these two arguments must contain a defeasible rule. Let us, without loss
of generality, assume that A contains at least one defeasible rule. Let d be a defeasible rule in A that has
minimal depth. Notice that the depth of d must be at least 1, for if d were the top-rule of A, then B would
defeat A and E would not be conflict-free. It now holds that every rule in A with a smaller depth than d is
a strict rule (see also Fig. 1). Let Ai be a subargument of A that has d as its top-rule. We will now prove
that there exists an argument (D′) in E that defeats Ai . Let A1, . . . ,An be the subarguments of A that are
at the same level as Ai in A. Lemma 6 tells us that with the conclusions of A1, . . . ,An,B it is possible to
construct an argument with a conclusion that is the opposite of the conclusion of Ai . Call this argument D.
Now, let D′ be equal to D, but with the assumptions Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An),Conc(B) substituted by
the underlying arguments A1, . . . ,An,B . It holds that D′ ∈ E (this is because each defeater of D′ is also a
defeater of A1, . . . ,An,B ∈ E, and the fact that E is a complete extension means it defends itself against this
defeater, which means that D′ ∈ E). D′, however, defeats Ai on d , so the fact that D′,Ai ∈ E means that E
is not conflict-free, and hence also no complete extension. Contradiction.
Indirect Consistency: Since the argumentation system satisfies Closure and Direct consistency, then according to
Proposition 7, then it also satisfies indirect consistency. 
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